Introduction
Together with "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) , "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914) is generally considered one of the most emblematic Freudian texts, an important turning point of psychoanalytical metapsychology, and a significant event in psychoanalytic history (e.g., Laplanche, 1970; Sandler et al., 2012) . Although the concept of narcissism was already occasionally mentioned by Freud in the years prior to the publication of "On Narcissism," the eponymous paper is, beyond any question, its locus classicus. It addresses narcissism in normal development ("falling in love"), pathology, group psychology, and introduces fundamental conceptual innovations (e.g., object-choice, identification, and the ego-ideal) which have led to a profound restructuring of theory. Apart from the fact that "On Narcissism" discloses the clinical field of narcissistic phenomena for the very first time, it is first and foremost the topos where Freud anchors narcissism as a genuine "organizing concept" in Freudian metapsychology. 1 In line with Ovid's Metamorphoses (trans. 1975, III, pp. 339-355) , left unmentioned by Freud, the Freudian use of "narcissism" initially seems to evoke the "classical" or even common-sense connotation of the concept-namely, extreme self-love. Simultaneously, however, narcissism is linked to the psychoanalytic understanding of the human capacity to (fall in) love and of the object-choice in general. 2 In line with Freud's "On Narcissism," which paved the way for an object-relational understanding of the Goddess Libido's mysterious ways, the link between narcissism and love was emphasized by many of Freud's followers (e.g., Balint, 1951; Lear, 1990) . Although additional aspects of narcissism would also be explored in the years to follow by post-Freudians like Heinz Kohut (1977) , Otto Kernberg (1992) , Sheldon Bach (1977) , and André Green (2001) , it is striking that "On Narcissism" seems to neglect the aggressive spectrum of narcissism. Especially given the prominent presence of the passion of love, an obvious negative aspect of narcissism seems to function as the text's blind spot: the destructive passion of hatred. Freud's fascination with obsessional neurosis at that time, however, soon would lead him to reconsider the issue of hatred in his so-called "Papers on Metapsychology," which include the somewhat neglected last part of his landmark paper "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915) , written shortly after "On Narcissism" (1914) . In this paper, I re-read Freud's "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" as a necessary complement to "On Narcissism." Although the issue of hatred is not taken into account there, I will argue that "On Narcissism" is the necessary backdrop for "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." The latter text plays a crucial role for the understanding of the conceptual shift in Freud's account of the relation of love and hatred. On the one hand, "On Narcissism" seems to be in line with Freud's earlier account of love as the primary and central passion, considering hatred as a secondary passion and a transformation of love. On the other hand, Freud's introduction of narcissism paves the way for a totally different account of love and hatred, exchanging love for hatred as the primary human passion. This view is explicitly developed in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." I argue that this is the only text where Freud develops a genuine metapsychology of hatred. Not only does Freud distinguish hatred from sadism as an autonomous phenomenon for the first time, but love is presented as secondary to hatred. The possibility of love overcoming hatred in the ego's primary object-relation can only be revealed by reconsidering Freud's phenomenology of hatred. around 1909. Whereas the case of Little Hans (1909) , who was suffering from anxiety neurosis hysteria, clearly is a testament to Freud's hysterical research matrix, the case of the Rat Man (1909) announces a shift towards obsessional neurosis. Unlike in hysterical cases, in obsessional neurosis the issue of aggressiveness, and notably the theme of love and hatred, assumes central importance, and in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" Freud presents an explicit study on human aggressiveness, one that finally manages to differentiate between sadism and hatred, establishing a genuine phenomenology of hatred.
In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud sketches for the first time a meta-psychological picture of hatred that should be radically distinguished from his earlier accounts. Though absent in "On Narcissism," hatred was briefly mentioned at the end of "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis," a short text that was published at the time Freud was writing "On Narcissism." In the former text, Freud is already hinting at the "possibility" of a particular, genuine account of hatred, apart from sadism. He does this in the context of some preliminary considerations of the ego development in obsessional neurotics. According to Freud, "some degree of this precocity of ego development" is "typical of human nature" (1913, p. 325) . It has to be noted that, in this very same passage, and prior to his renowned statement that "there must be something added to auto-erotism-a new psychical action-in order to bring about narcissism," Freud explicitly acknowledges that the ego is not-so the speak-initially available, but that it presupposes a developmental process (1914, p. 77) . In the context of this developmental account of the ego, Freud emphasizes "the fact that in the order of development hate is the precursor of love" (1913, p. 325) . Besides his explicit reference to Sandor Ferenczi's work on the development of the ego-his Stages in the development of the sense of reality (1913) in particular-Freud also acknowledges the developmental priority of hatred compared to love, a point of view of his pupil Wilhelm Stekel. Two years earlier, in Die Sprache des Traumes (1911), Stekel defined hatred as the ground of all psychic events. He argues that a new conception of life which relies on hatred as both the primal element and the basis of altruistic feelings, can be defended (1911, p. 536) . 3 In fact, Stekel's adoption of the very Nietzschean idea that love "grows out of hatred" (May, 2011, p. 193) , is exactly the account of hatred which Freud is elaborating in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." 4 It must be noted that the Freudian view on hatred in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," could only come into perspective given Freud's preoccupation with obsessional neurosis since the case study of the Rat Man (1909). 5 In this "new" research frame of obsessional neurosis, his new insights concerning the ego development and the role of the ego-instincts take a prominent place. It is clear that Freud's analysis of hatred is in line with his final suggestions in "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis." At the same time, however, a further elaboration on hatred could only be realized as the backdrop of "On Narcissism" (1914) .
Hatred, A Transformation of Love?
Freud's analysis of hatred in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes" starts from the idea that hatred has to be understood as originating from love, and thus having its origin in sexuality. Regarding love and hatred, Freud writes the following: "It is impossible to doubt that there is the most intimate relation between these two opposite feelings and sexual life" (1915, p. 133) . Moreover, the relation of love and hatred is presented here as a unique illustration of a single instance of the instincts' vicissitudes, that is, the "reversal into its opposite." Contrary to the vicissitudes of "original sadism," this particular reversal into the instinct's opposite does not imply "a change from activity to passivity", but a "reversal of its content." Freud maintains that the latter case is "found in the single instance of the transformation of love into hate" (1915, pp. 126-127) . More specifically, this "reversal of content" of love into hatred implies "the change of the content of an instinct into its opposite." According to Freud, this can be "observed in a single instance only-the transformation of love into hate" (1915, p. 133) .
At first sight, Freud's characterization of love and hatred is completely in line with his earlier account: love is presented as hatred's opposite with respect to its content, with both opposite feelings interrelated. In the same line of thought, Freud declares that love predates hatred. In other words, hatred originates from love. This is the same position he articulated in the case study of the Rat Man: love is older than hatred, and hatred is a partial transformation of love. 6 An adequate account of hatred presupposes an in-depth explanation of what is exactly understood by "love." And indeed, Freud makes an attempt to define the status of love, but it is clear that this is a problematic endeavor, mainly because he tries to define love by applying the concept of instinct. Hence, he concludes that "we are naturally unwilling to think of love as being some kind of special component instinct of sexuality in the same way as the others we have been discussing" (1915, p. 133) . For Freud, love has to be understood "as the expression of the whole sexual current of feeling" (1915, p. 133) . This implies that talking about love presupposes the condition in which both the component instincts are subordinated under the primacy of the genitals and an (adult) object choice is made possible. This means that love, in terms of "object love," is not at all a given, but is effectuated by a developmental process. This makes sense since Freud's concept of "love" implies a narcissistic subject, which also is the result of a development. This implies that love primarily needs to be understood by taking into account the vicissitudes of narcissism, rather than making an appeal to the instincts. Of course, this view has immediate consequences for Freud's interpretation of hatred. Hatred cannot equally be present from the start and thus presupposes both the development and the expression of the ego. In this sense, Freud's opposite feelings presuppose some common ground because love and hatred imply the existence of a narcissistic subject.
Freud makes it clear that both love and hatred are not preexisting conditions. The situation characterized by the antithesis between loving and hating presupposes another condition, that is, the condition of "indifference." "Loving and hating taken together are the opposite of the condition of unconcern or indifference, " Freud argues (1915, p. 133) . In what follows, we will see that, according to Freud, the condition of indifference corresponds to a particular configuration of the ego predating the possibility of love and hatred. He elaborates this hypothesis in "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis," maintaining that in obsessional neurotics, hatred must be considered in relation to the issue of the ego development (1913, p. 325) .
The Ego's Indifference Towards the External World
When Freud introduces the condition of indifference, it is immediately situated against the backdrop of the development of the ego. In fact, this condition of indifference or disinterest precedes any possible distinction between subject and object. Freud defines it in terms of "a primal psychical situation" in which two "polarities of the mind" coincide. This means that the "antithesis ego-non-ego (external), i.e. subject-object" coincides with the "polarity pleasure-unpleasure" (1915, pp. 133-134 ). This condition is described by Freud as follows:
Originally, at the very beginning of mental life, the ego is cathected with instincts and is to some extent capable of satisfying them on itself. We call this condition 'narcissism' and this way of obtaining satisfaction 'auto-erotic. ' (1915, p. 134) In the so-called primal narcissistic condition, the ego in question has to be understood in terms of an organic unity in which auto-erotic and narcissistic tendencies cannot easily be distinguished. Moreover, Freud argues that the primal narcissistic condition maintains itself. He notes: "[E]very individual passes through a period during which he is helpless and has to be looked after and during which his pressing needs are satisfied by an external agency and are thus prevented from become greater" (1915, pp. 134-135, footnote 2) . This state of primal narcissism is, however, not absolute. According to Freud: Those sexual instincts which from the outset require an object, and the needs of the ego-instincts, which are never capable of auto-erotic satisfaction, naturally disturb this state [of primal narcissism] and so pave the way for an advance from it. (1915, pp. 134-135, footnote 2) Given the fact that, as Freud made clear in Three Essays, infantile sexuality is generally objectless, the narcissistic condition is not really threatened by the existing "exceptions" that do need an object, such as sadism.
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Besides contributing to the further comprehension of the pairs of opposites, the narcissistic condition also allows Freud to reconsider his account of the satisfaction of the ego-instincts. The coincidence of "ego" and "pleasure" implies that the ego attributes the pleasure, experienced in the satisfaction of needs and achieved through the outside world's mediation, to itself. This enables Freud to state the following:
At this time the external world is not cathected with interest (in a general sense) and is indifferent for purposes of satisfaction. During this period, therefore, the ego-subject coincides with what is pleasurable and the external world with what is indifferent (or possibly unpleasurable, as being a source of stimulation). (1915, pp. 134-135) Accordingly, primal narcissism's ego is defined by Freud as the "original 'reality-ego', which distinguished internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion" (1915, p. 136) . The indifference towards the external world implies that the external world is not experienced by the ego as "external" or "non-ego." Therefore, any conflict between an internal and an external world is totally out of the question. The experience of pleasure goes together with the existence of an ego. This ego is everything there is and, thus, is impossibly interested in the external world. In the context of this primal narcissistic state, "loving" is defined by Freud as "the relation of the ego to its sources of pleasure" (1915, p. 135) . This means that loving is concerned with the benefits for the ego. These benefits include the ego's pleasure experiences in the satisfaction of either its needs or its libidinal tendencies. Given the fact that the primal narcissistic condition excludes any other experience but of the ego, the ego's relation to its sources of pleasure implies a relation to itself. In that condition there is indeed only one reality: everything coincides with the ego and with pleasure. The ego is thus not positioned against the world, but the ego is the world. It is in this way that we should understand Freud's following claim: " [T] he situation in which the ego loves itself only and is indifferent to the external world illustrates the first of the opposites which we found to 'loving'" (1915, p. 135) . Therefore, the ego, coinciding with the world, can be considered as a solipsistic ego, completely dominated by pleasure. This condition implies that pleasure is the only reality.
In the primal narcissistic state, both the pleasure through libidinal satisfaction and the pleasure through the instincts of self-preservation are attributed to the ego. Nevertheless, the primal narcissistic state is subverted by the latter instincts. Freud argues:
In so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but, in consequence of experiences undergone by the instincts of self-preservation, it acquires objects from that world, and, in spite of everything, it cannot avoid feeling internal instinctual stimuli for a time as unpleasurable. (1915, p. 135) This means that, for the very first time, the ego's world, which is entirely ruled by the pleasure principle, is subverted by internal instinctual stimuli. The latter are associated with the instincts of self-preservation. When the internal needs are not (immediately) satisfied, they cause unpleasure, subverting the primal narcissistic condition. Freud holds that the individual "at an early stage" has the experience "that it can silence external stimuli by means of muscular action but is defenceless against instinctual stimuli" (1915, p. 134). The child is confronted with unpleasure stemming from stimuli of the instincts of self-preservation. Simultaneously, however, the organism itself is confronted with an external world. This means that the unpleasure related to self-preservation, directs the child to the external world. Only then does the latter confront the ego's world. In the experience of unpleasure, which originates from the instincts of self-preservation, the external world presents itself as object in front of the ego. In other words, unpleasure is responsible for the coming into being of the ego as differentiated from an "outside."
Hatred as the Relation Towards the External World
Freud makes clear that the confrontation with unpleasure inaugurates a new developmental phase. He argues, "Under the dominance of the pleasure principle a further development now takes place in the ego" (1915, pp. 135-136) . At the moment of the experience of unpleasure the external world is forced upon the ego as something external and unpleasurable for the first time. It is precisely at this point that Freud situates the developmental transition of the original "reality-ego" into "a purified 'pleasure-ego,' which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others" (1915, p. 136) . For the first time, the ego has the experience that pleasure is not the only reality. Despite the confrontation with the fact that not everything is pleasurable, however, the purified pleasure ego takes the pursuit of pleasure as its evident rule. In this respect, the pleasure-ego's qualification as being "purified" cannot but be understood in terms of the pleasure-ego being under the spell of the pleasure principle. Simultaneously, however, the ego is at least equally acquainted with the experience of unpleasure-though without being in the pursuit of the latter. According to Freud, the purified pleasure-ego manages to continue its pleasurable condition in the following way:
In so far as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, "introjects" them (to use Ferenczi's [1909] Ruled by the pleasure principle, Freud's purified pleasureego expands itself to the world, in so far as the outside world is pleasurable. As such, this world becomes the world of the purified pleasure-ego. The same pleasure principle, thus, is driving the purified pleasure-ego to rid or purify itself from unpleasure by expelling it towards the outside world. By means of projection the purified pleasure ego is splitting itself off from the unpleasurable external reality, which as such becomes an opposing object. Thus, Freud writes the following:
For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile. (1915, p. 136) A purified pleasure-ego is the result of this operation. The ego fully coincides with pleasure again. From now on, however, it is equally related to an external reality experienced as completely unpleasurable. The resulting particular ego position testifies to the fact that the ego is no longer indifferent; the purified pleasure-ego must be considered as opposed to a hostile, unpleasurable external world. Freud describes the changed situation as follows: "After this new arrangement, the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure (with what was earlier indifference)" (1915, p. 136) . It has to be clear that this development does not imply a reorganization aiming at restoration or consolidation of the earlier opposition between loving and indifference. To the contrary, it effectuates a new developmental phase of the ego and creates the necessary and sufficient condition for the "birth" of hatred.
The condition of the purified pleasure-ego implies that the aforementioned original narcissistic state gives way to "the stage of primary narcissism" (1915, p. 136) . In this stage there is an ego which is standing as a subject in opposition to the outside world as an object. Hence, the purified pleasure-ego is no longer indifferent, but actively positioning itself against the unpleasurable outside world. Freud writes that when "the object makes its appearance, the second opposite to loving, namely hating, also attains its development" (1915, p. 136) . Freud reminds us, in fact, that hatred starts to develop via the first experience of unpleasure. The first cracks in the primordial real ego were caused by the frustration of the instincts of self-preservation:
[T]he object is brought to the ego from the external world in the first instance by the instincts of self-preservation; and it cannot be denied that hating, too, originally characterized the relation of the ego to the alien external world with the stimuli it introduces. (1915, p. 136) When the outside world, to which the ego was indifferent before, manifests itself as unpleasurable by means of the expression of unsatisfied needs, hatred comes into being. From this moment onwards, the same outside world, which did not matter at all in the condition of indifference, is experienced as the object of hatred. From this perspective, indifference is the precursor of hatred. "Indifference falls into place as a special case of hate or dislike, after having first appeared as their forerunner," Freud argues. "At the very beginning, it seems, the external world, objects, and what is hated are identical" (1915, p. 136) . However, the purified pleasure-ego functions in an extremely opportunistic way and merely conforms with the pleasure principle. Loving is thus reduced by Freud to the experience of pleasure by means of what serves the ego. This implies that loving functions pragmatically and concerns the object that was previously hated:
If later on an object turns out to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but it is also incorporated into the ego; so that for the purified pleasure-ego once again objects coincide with what is extraneous and hated. (1915, p. 136) The purified pleasure-ego's loving and hating is defined by Freud in terms of "relations." He acknowledges that, "[w]hen the purely narcissistic stage has given place to the object-stage, pleasure and unpleasure signify relations of the ego to the object" (1915, pp. 136-137) . In the condition of loving, the relation of the purified pleasure-ego to an object can correspondingly be understood by referring to Ferenczi's concept of "introjection."
9 The purified pleasure-ego continues to expand its world by incorporating pleasurable objects as they appear. This relation is described by Freud as follows:
If the object becomes a source of pleasurable feelings, a motor urge is set up which seeks to bring the object closer to the ego and to incorporate it into the ego. We then speak of the "attraction" exercised by the pleasure-giving object, and say that we "love" that object. (1915, p. 137) In a certain sense, the pleasurable object loses its object status in relation to the purified pleasure-ego as introjection results in the object becoming part of the ego. The relation implied in loving is characterized by the pleasure in self-love which now encompasses the extended ego's world.
Nevertheless, the purified pleasure-ego is also confronted with unpleasurable objects. Instead of introjecting these objects, the ego splits them off by means of the mechanism of "projection." Freud argues:
[I]f the object is a source of unpleasurable feelings, there is an urge which endeavours to increase the distance between the object and the ego and to repeat in relation to the object the original attempt at flight from the external world with its emission of stimuli. (1915, p. 137) The unpleasurable object is confronted with the limits of the purified pleasure-ego, being regulated by the pleasure principle. From the moment that there is a reality situated outside the ego's world, this reality becomes an "external world" or "object" to the ego. Because it is unpleasurable, the object remains external. Hence, the only possible relation between the purified pleasure-ego and the external world is defined as hatred. Freud gives the following explanation: "We feel the 'repulsion' of the object, and hate it; this hate can afterwards be intensified to the point of an aggressive inclination against the object, an intention to destroy it" (1915, p. 137) . It is clear that, at this point, Freud is suggesting a difference between hatred and aggression. He suggests that the destruction of the object is only one possible outcome of hatred, but it is not necessarily its effect.
Freud gives the impression that the purified pleasure-ego is effectuated by the experience of unpleasure, resulting in the emergence of hatred for the unpleasurable external world. Unlike hatred, loving is not an expression of a relation towards an external object. Loving exclusively refers to the narcissistic self-love of the purified pleasure ego, which is extending towards everything that is in favor of the ego's pleasure experience. In contrast to loving, which is self-enclosed, hatred is characterized by a subject which relates to an "outside." As such, hatred implies the position of an ego as subject. Freud reconsiders this as follows:
We might at a pinch say of an instinct that it "loves" the objects towards which it strives for purposes of satisfaction; but to say that an instinct "hates" an object strikes us as odd. Thus we become aware that attitudes of love and hate cannot be made use of for the relations of instincts to their objects, but are reserved for the relations of the total ego to objects. (1915, p. 137) This total ego takes itself as an object in loving, while in the case of hatred the object is the external world.
It was already noted that, contrary to loving, hatred is the expression of a purified pleasure-ego, which is regulated by the pleasure principle, in relation to an external, unpleasurable reality. Freud argues that the subject actively splits off this external reality. This gesture implies a particularly active involvement of the total ego, which is clearly absent in the loving of the purified pleasure-ego. The latter case, to the contrary, comprises a manifestation of original self-love, as it can be seen in primary narcissism. Freud characterizes this original self-love as follows: "This situation is that of loving oneself, which we regard as the characteristic feature of narcissism" (1915, p. 133) . The purified pleasure-ego's loving, thus, rather exemplifies "the passive one [aim] of being loved" which Freud situates "near to narcissism" (1915, p. 133) . Since loving is exclusively introverted, there is no question of a total ego's active attitude towards an external reality. This kind of attitude is, however, clearly expressed in the case of hatred.
Hatred and the Ego-Instincts
Freud's attempt at a definition of loving and hating is fundamentally determined by his account of the ego's devel-opment. Given the constitution of the ego, hatred is prior to love. Hatred comes into being in the phase of primary narcissism, in which the unpleasurable external world is approached by the ego as the hated object. This means that the external world primarily reveals itself to the subject in the condition of hatred. Genuine love, however, which comes into being after hatred, has its forerunners in a kind of loving that does not yet imply an external object. Whereas loving implies the purified pleasure-ego, taking itself as its own object, hatred expresses the relation of the ego towards the outside world.
Also, with regard to the instincts and instinctual satisfaction, there is another significant difference between love and hatred. Love is specifically characterized by the experience of pleasure related to the sexual instincts. Apart from the fact that love requires a pleasurable relation with an external object, Freud also points out the particular experience of pleasure in sexual satisfaction. Freud explains this as follows:
Thus the word "to love" moves further and further into the sphere of pure pleasure-relation of the ego to the object and finally becomes fixed to sexual subjects in the narrower sense and to those which satisfy the needs of sublimated sexual instincts. The distinction between the ego-instincts and the sexual instincts which we have imposed upon our psychology is thus seen to be in conformity with the spirit of our language. (1915, p. 137) Only after the latency period, with the start of adult sexuality, is the sexual instinct capable of acquiring pleasure from external reality by the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. It is only in this context that Freud is talking about loving in the strict sense. This means that, from now on, the ego is capable of experiencing pleasure from an external reality by means of the satisfaction of its sexual instincts. The act of love then implies an active stance towards an external reality:
The fact that we are not in the habit of saying that of a single sexual instinct that it loves its object, but regard the relation of the ego to its sexual object as the most appropriate case in which to employ the word "love"-this fact teaches us that the word can only begin to be applied in this relation after there has been a synthesis of all the component instincts of sexuality under the primacy of the genitals and in the service of the reproductive function. (1915, pp. 137-138) It is clear that for Freud both love and hatred presuppose an ego which is invested in a relationship with an external object. Apart from the fact that this kind of relationship is expressed much earlier in hatred than in love, there is a much more important difference between the two of them. This has to do with the instincts that are at play in the case of hatred. In this respect, Freud makes the following remark: "It is noteworthy that in the use of the word 'hate' no such intimate connection with sexual pleasure and the sexual function appears. The relation of unpleasure seems to be the sole decisive one" (1915, p. 138) . Although the experience of unpleasure, which is at the basis of hatred, primarily pertains to the frustration of the ego-instincts, Freud leaves the specific nature of the unpleasure motivating hatred undecided, but nevertheless, clearly understands hatred as a manifestation of the ego-instincts. He says:
The ego hates, abhors, and pursues with intent to destroy all objects which are a source of unpleasurable feeling for it, without taking into account whether they mean a frustration of sexual satisfaction or of the satisfaction of self-preservative needs. Indeed, it might be asserted that the true prototypes of the relation of hate are derived not from life, but from the ego's struggle to preserve and maintain itself. (1915, p. 138) This connection between hatred and the ego-instincts implies an important point of difference from his initial hypothesis of hatred as a transformation of love. While love is exclusively related to the sexual instinct, hatred is exclusively connected with the instincts of self-preservation. Hence, Freud considers hatred to be an "expression" of the ego-instincts. "As an expression of the relation of unpleasure evoked by objects," he argues, "it always remains in an intimate relation with the self-preservative instincts; so that sexual and ego-instincts can readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate" (1915, p. 139) .
By understanding hatred as a particular manifestation originating from the ego-instincts, Freud denounces his earlier hypothesis which presented love and hatred as a "reversal of content." From now on, love and hatred are considered as two different phenomena. Freud explains this as follows:
[L]ove and hate which present themselves to us as complete opposites in their content, do not after all stand in any simple relation to each other. They did not arise from the cleavage of any originally common entity, but sprang from different sources, and had each its own development before the influence of the pleasure-unpleasure relation made them into opposites. (1915, p. 138) According to Freud, the opposition between hatred and love comes into being very late: "Not until the genital organization is established does love become the opposite of hate" (1915, p. 139) . Unlike the condition of love, there can only be hatred once a purified pleasure-ego comes into being. Freud states that "[h]ate, as a relation to objects, is older than love" (1915, p. 139) .
Despite their different origins and their own particular developmental course, (the precursors of) love and hatred are, often simultaneously at work. As Freud argues, "The history of the origins and relations of love makes us understand how it is that love so frequently manifests itself as 'ambivalent'-i.e. as accompanied by impulses of hate against the same object" (1915, p. 139) . This can be illustrated by referring to the aforementioned history of the obsessional-neurotic Rat Man. In such cases, the forerunner of love has some characteristics in common with hatred, though without coinciding with it. Again, and contrary to what he argued at the time he wrote the Rat Man case, Freud emphasizes that sadism cannot merely be reduced to hatred: "When the ego-instincts dominate the sexual function, as is the case at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they impart the qualities of hate to the instinctual aim as well" (1915, p. 139) . In similar cases of ambivalence towards the object, it has to be noted that " [t] he hate which is admixed with love is in part derived from the preliminary stages of loving which have not been wholly surmounted; it is also in part based on reactions of repudiation by the ego-instincts" (1915, p. 139) . Nevertheless, these two sources can in fact be reduced to only one source. "In both cases, therefore," Freud argues, "the admixed hate has as its source the self-preservative instincts" (1915, p. 139 ).
Freud's further elucidation of the ego's constitution in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" has contributed to a thorough clarification of both the conceptions of love and hatred (and their relation). Hatred can no longer be considered a transformation of love, which would be more original than hatred (1909, pp. 238-239) . While, for a long time, love and hatred were considered by Freud as coinciding with the instincts, from "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" onwards it is argued that both love and hatred imply a relationship of an ego with an object. Hatred is the expression of the ego's repulsion of the object. This repulsion is motivated by the instincts of self-preservation and, after some time, may also effectuate the destruction of the object. Unlike love, however, hatred does not have any intense contact with the sexual instinct. Considering the ego's primary relation towards the outside world as an object, hatred is older than love.
Whereas Freud, in the case study of the Rat Man, was still convinced that "love, if it is denied satisfaction, may easily be partly converted into hatred" (1909, pp. 238-239) , "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" demonstrates his changed opinion. In fact, Freud returns to this particular example, referring to his earlier opinion: "If a love-relation with a given object is broken off, hate not infrequently emerges in its place, so that we get the impression of a transformation of love into hate" (1915, p. 139, author's italics for emphasis). Although sexual motives can be at stake, the hatred in question does not have its origin in a sexual source. Freud holds the idea "that the hate, which has its real motives, is here reinforced by a regression of the love to the sadistic preliminary stage; so that the hate acquires an erotic character and the continuity of a love-relation is ensured" (1915, p. 139) .
Conclusion
With respect to the theme of human aggressivity in general and the phenomenon of hatred in particular, Freud's "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" is a crucial text. Freud is not only presenting a separate, fully fledged analysis of hatred, but also argues against his earlier and preliminary insights into its nature. Whereas, prior to "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," hatred was considered as a derivative form or epiphenomenon of sadism, it is now recognized by Freud as a separate phenomenon. Thus, in contrast to sadism, hatred is not the expression of a sexual instinct, but coincides with the constitution of the ego. Besides being its own particular phenomenon, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" has shown that hatred is equally understood as an expression related to the ego-instincts.
In contrast to the most obvious reading of the text, focusing on the particular issue in the title, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" was presented here with a particular focus on the often neglected last part of the text. This close reading allows us to highlight the text from the perspective of Freud's growing interest in the ego and its development. As such, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915) becomes a further step in the evolution of Freud's thinking, starting in "The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis" (1913) and culminating in "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914) . In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," it becomes clear that Freud's introduction of narcissism not only put its mark on the already existing conceptualization of issues like sadism and masochism, but to a larger extent, allowed a genuine Freudian account of hatred. Hatred is presented by Freud as an expression of non-sexual aggression to be distinguished from the perversions of sadism and masochism, the latter being an expression of sexual aggressivity. In this perspective, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" not only becomes one of the most important places where Freud argues in favor of an aggressivity beyond non-sexual aggressivity, but also reveals hatred as the dark side of narcissism which had been left unnoticed in "On Narcissism." The primacy of hatred as preceding love also implies the revelation of hatred as the dark truth of love. The human possibility of the passion of love is presented by Freud as a victory over hatred. Although Freud's account of hatred paved the way for subsequent landmark papers such as " Mourning and Melancholia" (1917) , "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" will remain the topos where hatred is most explicitly discussed. For, contrary to what one should expect, the equally important meta-psychological turning point of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920) will obscure the concept of hatred once again by restaging it is one of the vicissitudes of the death instinct (De Vleminck, 2016 & 2017b . In the same vein as the late Freud, Melanie Klein pictures hatred, alongside sadism, as an expression of the death instinct (1998). At the same time, like Freud, she attributes a fundamental role to hatred, picturing love as the preliminary victory over hatred. We can also find the primacy of hatred the writings of Donald Winnicott, who emphasized the possibility to love as a developmental achievement (1992), whereas Wilfred Bion rather postulates both love (L) and hatred (H), alongside knowledge (K), as "basic emotions" and basic "links" in order to develop the idea of the linking of objects (1962, pp. 42-43) . It is clear that both Winnicott and Bion were fascinated by the ultimate power of love, whereas both Klein and Freud held a rather pessimistic image of mankind, picturing hatred as the dark truth of love.
10 Notes 1. The concept appears for the first time in a commentary by Freud regarding a lecture by Isidor Sadger at a meeting (1909, November) of the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society (Nunberg & Federn, 1967) . The concept is mentioned by Freud in a 1910 footnote to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905a) , in his study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910) , in the Schreber Study (1911 [1910] ), and in the last essay of Totem and Taboo (1912-13) . Three years before Freud himself finally devoted a separate text on the subject, Otto Rank published "A contribution to Narcissism" (1911). Freud's paper was a response to Rank's text, as well as a response to both Adler's 'The Aggressive Instinct in Life and in Neurosis" (1908) and Jung's Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido (1911-12) . For the underlying Freud-Jung discussion, see Vandermeersch (1991) . For Freud's discussion with Adler, see Handlbauer (1998) . 2. For a brief overview of narcissism's conceptual history from Binet to Jung, see Engels (2013) . 3. The first part of Stekel's book was translated into English as "Sex and Dreams:
The Language of Dreams" and was "For sale only to Members of the Medical Profession" (Stekel 1922 , cover page). The quotation, however, comes from the last part of the original volume's general conclusion ("Rückblicke"). For the reception of Stekel's work, see Bos & Groenendijk (2007) . 4. For a recent study of Nietzsche's account of hatred, see Siemens (2015) . 5. Freud also wrote about obsessional neurosis prior to the Rat Man case study. In fact, in 1895-96, Freud was the first person to consider obsessional neurosis as a separate entity apart from hysteria (May-Tolzmann, 1998 ). 6. In the case study of the Rat Man, Freud writes: "We know that incipient love is often perceived as hatred, and that love, if it is denied satisfaction, may easily be partly converted into hatred, and poets tell us that in the more tempestuous stages of love the two opposed feelings may subsist side by side for a while as though in rivalry with each other" (1909, pp. 238-239) . 7. For an analysis of status and nature of (infantile) sexuality in relation to its object in Three Essays, see Van Haute & Westerink (2016) . 8. Freud's conception of the purified pleasure-ego corresponds seamlessly with what Ferenczi has in mind in his "Introjection and Transference" (1909) with respect to the general mechanism of "introjection." In the Schreber case study, Freud uses the term "projection" for the first time (1911, p. 66). 9. With regard to "introjection," Ferenczi writes the following: "We may suppose that to the new-born child everything perceived by the senses appears unitary, so to speak monistic. Only later does he learn to distinguish from his ego the malicious things, forming an outer world, that do not obey his will.
[…] If the individual has unsettled affects at his disposal, and these he soon has, he accepts this challenge by extending his 'interest' from the ego on to the part of the outer world. The first loving and hating is a transference of auto-erotic and unpleasant feelings on to the objects that evoke those feelings. The first 'object-love' and the first 'object-hate' are, so to speak, the primordial transferences, the roots of every future introjection" (1909, pp. 48-49 
